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Making The Workplace 'Safe' In 
Capitalism: 
The Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Nineteenth-
Century Ontario 
Eric Tucker 
No ONE HAS EVER ATTEMPTED to estimate the total number of workers 
in Ontario who have been killed or injured, or whose health has been im-
paired, over the last 100 years as a result of their work. Even if a conserva-
tive estimate were produced, I have little doubt that most people would be 
shocked, and would find that the toll was unacceptably high.' In 1985 
alone, over 426,880 claims were filed with the Ontario Workers' Compensa-
tion Board,2 and experts agree that Board figures underestimate the true 
significance of the problem.' 
High levels of occupationally related death, injury, and disease have per-
sisted over the last 100 years, notwithstanding that, throughout this period, 
the state has had the legal authority to impose health and safety standards 
on employers, and to implement those standards through a full-time inspec-
torate armed with substantial enforcement powers. The creation of this power 
and the failure to exercise it effectively raises some difficult questions about 
the role of the state in a capitalist social formation in general, and about 
the relations between labour and the state in particular. It is the purpose of 
'Recent increases in the number of claims filed with the Workers' Compensation Board in On-
tario caused William Wrye, then provincial Minister of Labour, to comment, "There is, to be 
frank, a distressing carnage in our workplaces which all of us are not adequately addressing." 
Quoted in The Globe and Mail, 16 May 1986. 
:Ontario. Workers' Compensation Board, Annual Report (1986). 
'T. Ison, The Dimensions of Industrial Disease (Kingston n9197 and d. Sass, "Workplpce 
Health and Safety: Report From Canada," International Journal of Health Services, 16 11986), 
565. 
Eric Tucker, "Making The Workplace 'Safe' In Capitalism: The Enforcement of Factory Legisla-
tion in Nineteenth Century Ontario," LabourLeTravail, 21 (Spring 1988), 45-85. 
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this paper to contribute to a discussion of these broad issues by examining 
the early development of occupational health and safety regulation in On-
tario. Why was the state empowered to regulate occupational health and safety 
in the late nineteenth century, and why was this power exercised with such 
little effect? 
This paper will focus on the later question. Aside from considerations 
of space, there are at least two reasons for concentrating on the implemen-
tation of Ontario's Factory Act* rather than on its enactment. First, 
although no comprehensive study of the enactment of the Act has yet been 
published, a number of well-known works have touched on the subject.' No 
one, however, has yet examined the early implementation of that legisla-
tion.6 Second, the failure to study implementation reflects a tendency to 
conceptualize the state as a monolithic structure that can be analyzed primarily 
in terms of the activities of its more overt political institutions, processes, 
and figures. While these are obviously significant, both instrumental^ and 
symbolically, a critical component of our understanding of the role and dy-
namics of the capitalist state will be lost unless adequate attention is focused 
on how state power is actually exercised by the officials on whom it is con-
ferred. 
The theoretical framework employed in this paper is premised on the view 
that there are structural imperatives in a capitalist social formation that weigh 
heavily on the choice and implementation of state policies. In particular, the 
state is constrained by the need to facilitate capitalist accumulation or to main-
tain "business confidence." The failure to do so is threatening to the state 
because it may lead to a decline in the level of private investment, which in 
turn may cause a drop in government revenue and an economic recession 
for which the state will be held responsible by the electorate. This pressure, 
however, does not invariably translate into state policies that facilitate 
capitalist accumulation. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the market 
also generates pressure on the state to protect subordinate classes. If the state 
fails to respond to this pressure it may suffer a loss of electoral support, or 
worse, face disruptions to the social and economic order. Thus, state policy 
is not determined by a logic of structural necessity. Rather, it is selected and 
'The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884, ,.O. .184, ,c .9. 
5See Eugene Forsey, "A Note on the Dominion Factory Bills of the Eighteen-Eighties," Cana-
dian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 11 31947), ,800 Bernnad Ostryy ,Conserva-
tives, Liberals, and Labour in the 1880's," Canadian Journal of Economics ana Political Science, 
27 (1961), 141; and Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism 
1867-1892 2Toronto o980). Also oee, ,inda aohnen, ,Women Workers in Ontario: A Socioo 
Legal History," U.T. Fac. L. Rev., 31 (1973), 45. 
'The only sustained study of the enforcement of factory legislation in Ontario is Michael Piva, 
The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto - 1900-1921 (Ottawa 19197 and, as the title 
indicates, it does not deal with the period from 1886-1900. 
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implemented within a set of potentially contradictory constraints. Further-
more, these constraints do not exist independently of the actions taken by 
dominant and subordinant classes, even though these actions are themselves 
conditioned by a structural logic. Therefore, it is critical that we examine 
both the structural processes of capitalist development and the political or-
ganization and ideological orientation of different classes in order to under-
stand state policy at a particular historical juncture.' 
However, I also reject the view that the state's actions can be understood 
solely by reference to structural processes and class struggles taking place 
outside the state. Internal characteristics of the state including, its federal 
structure, the division of power between its legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches, and its bureaucratic organization mediate social and political 
processes and affect state policy. As well, there are highly specific and, 
perhaps, contingent factors operating. Finally, no account of nineteenth cen-
tury factory legislation can be complete if it focuses on class to the exclusion 
of gender. The development of industrial capitalism undermined familial 
patriarchy by removing the material basis of the father/husband's control 
over the family. State intervention needs to be analyzed from this perspec-
tive as well.8 
By way of general background, then, the following points should be not-
ed. Southern Ontario experienced a period of rapid industrial growth in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Although this development was un-
even, there can be no doubt that industrial capitalism emerged as a major 
force affecting the lives of Canadian workers.' The introduction of steam 
powered machinery, new technologies, and large crowded workplaces com-
bined with the intensification of the labour process through speed-ups, higher 
levels of supervision and discipline, piece work wages, and sweating produced 
serious occupational health and safety hazards for workers. As well, the in-
troduction of wage labour drew women and children into the industrial labour 
force in increasing numbers. They were largely excluded from jobs tradition-
ally performed by craftsmen, at least so long as craft control could be main-
This framework reflects the views of neo-Marxist writers on the state including Claus Offe, 
Contradictions of the Welfare etata (Cambridge 1984); Jurgen nabermas, Legitimation Crisis 
(Boston 1975); and Eric Olin Wright, Class, Crisis snd the etate (Londoo n978). For ra nxcel-
lent review of Marxist theories of the state see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theorr 
(Princeton 1984). For a study of the development of state labour policy that applies this ap-
proach see Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 
1900-1911 (Toronto o980)0 ,57-77; 353-8. 
Jane Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: A case study of Family, Labour 
and Welfare Legislation in Canada," in James Dickinson and Bob Russel, eds.. Family, Econ-
omy and State (London 1986), 150. 
For an overview of this development see Kealey & Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be: The 
Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1899 (Cambridge e982), chap. .1 
48 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
tained, and instead were ghettoized in positions that paid half the wages rates 
of men. 
Initially, the state, through the courts, opted for a system of market regu-
lation. That is, the courts refused to establish any obligation on employers 
to provide minimum levels of protection to employees. Rather, the matter 
was left to the labour market. In legal theory, workers and employers were 
juridical equals who met in the marketplace to bargain over the terms and 
conditions of employment. Other things being equal, workers would demand 
additional compensation to perform riskier jobs. Indeed, the courts construct-
ed a legal presumption that workers had voluntarily assumed the risks that 
were present in their workplaces, including the risk of injury from the acts 
of fellow servants. Employers facing worker demands for risk premiums 
would decide whether it was cheaper to pay the premium or reduce the risk. 
The market would aggregate these individual decisions and economically ef-
ficient levels of health and safety would be produced.10 
One way that workers responded to the selection of market regulation 
by the courts was to call on politicians to legislate minimum standards. 
Although this demand was initially made in the 1870s, it was not until the 
1880s when labour was much better organized, that they were able to bring 
sustained pressure on the state to take action. Workers, however, were not 
the only group seeking state regulation of factories. Middle class reformers, 
imbued with Victorian notions of the family and femininity, saw the em-
ployment of women and children in factories as a dangerous practice, 
threatening to undermine the moral and physical foundations of the social 
order. Women were seen to be more physically vulnerable to the rigours of 
factory work, especially with regard to their reproductive capacity, and there 
was great concern that moral standards would decline if the sexes were not 
separated at work. Reformers also feared that children's physical develop-
ment would be stunted, and that without proper education, they would de-
velop into a class dangerous to the community. Thus, they too sought to 
have the state intervene to prevent these developments. Canadian manufac-
turers generally opposed factory legislation, but the Canadian Manufacturers' 
Association (CMA) was resigned to its inevitability. They recognized that 
factory legislation was a regular feature of industrialized economies and, as 
such, saw it as part of the price of the National Policy. They sought to delay 
its enactment and to insure that its impact would be moderate. In particu-
lar, they were concerned that power conferred on inspectors should be con-
strained, fearing that pro-labour inspectors would be appointed. 
Although most political lobbying was directed at the Dominion govern-
ment, factory legislation was first enacted provincially. For the Ontario Liber-
10Tucker, "The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: the Search for A Theory," 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 22(1984), 213. 
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als under Mowat, the enactment of factory legislation provided an 
opportunity to simultaneously consolidate labour support and to assert a 
broad interpretation of the province's constitutional powers in circumstances 
in which it would be embarrassing for the Dominion government to challenge 
them. Although the Act was passed in 1884, it was not declared in force un-
til 1886." This allowed the Liberals to claim credit with workers without 
needlessly antagonizing manufacturers. During this time the courts adopted 
a more de-centralized view of the British North America Act and the provin-
cial Liberals sought to draw the Dominion government into litigation, but 
they declined. In 1886, the Liberals were able to claim credit with workers 
again by declaring the Act in force just on the eve of the appointment of 
the Royal Commission into Relations Between Labour and Capital by the 
Macdonald government. 
The content of Ontario's factory act was shaped by these political forces. 
There were three kinds of provisions in the Act: those specifically regulating 
child and female labour; those regulating all factory work; and those deal-
ing with administration and enforcement. It should be noted that the Act 
had limited application. As it name implies, it only applied to persons em-
ployed in factories. The Act did not define employee, but it did exclude per-
sons engaged in repair work from its protection (s. 23). Section 2(1) defined 
factories broadly, but specifically exempted places employing less than twenty 
persons and, in some cases, private dwelling houses from its provisions. As 
well, section 21 exempted some private dwellings and factories not employ-
ing children and young girls from specific provisions relating to health con-
ditions, posting and accident reporting requirements. 
Children were defined as persons under the age of fourteen, and young 
girls were defined as girls between the ages of 14 and 18 (s. 2(5) and 2(6)). 
Section 5 imposed a general prohibition on the employment of children, young 
girls or women under conditions in which it would be likely that their health 
would be permanently injured. Violators were subject to imprisonment for 
six months or to a fine of up to $100 plus costs. Section 6 of the Act speci-
fied a number of circumstances under which a violation of section 5 would 
be deemed to have occurred. First, it was unlawful to employ a boy under 
the age of 12 and a girl under the age of 14.i: Boys between the ages of 12 
to 14 could be employed provided the employer obtained a certificate attest-
ing to the child's age from the parent or guardian (s. 6(2)). The parents of 
an under-age child found working in a factory were liable to be fined up 
to $50.00 or imprisoned for up to 3 months (s. 17). To facilitate the enforce-
ment of these age restrictions, the Act stipulated that persons found on fac-
Public Archives of Ontario, RG3, O.C. 20/429, Order-in-Council, 5 Oct. 1886. 
"Section 6(1). The original Bill made it illegal to employ children under twelve regardless of 
gender. It was amended at the urging of the TTLC to extend greater protection to young girls. 
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tory premises were deemed to be employees and that if a child appeared to 
the court to be under-age, the burden lay on the defendant to prove the child 
was of legal age (s. 3). Second, a ten hour day and a sixty-hour week were 
established as the maximum hours of work for children, young girls and wom-
en, although the Act allowed some flexibility in order to permit a short day's 
work on Saturday (s. 6(3)). The Act also provided that the Lieutenant-
Governor could make regulations empowering the Inspector to issue over-
time permits under certain circumstances, provided that work did not begin 
before 6 a.m. or end after 9 p.m., that hours did not exceed more than 12 
1/2 in a day, or 72 in a week, and that overtime was not worked more than 
six weeks a year." As well, section 9 required employers to maintain a 
register of overtime worked pursuant to the inspector's permit. Notice of 
the hours of work was required to be posted on prescribed forms. Third, 
women and children were entitled to a one hour lunch break and the inspec-
tor was given the authority to order that lunch not be taken in a work room, 
but rather in a suitable dining room provided by the employer at his own 
expense. Finally, the Act prohibited women and children from performing 
certain duties that could be performed legally by adult males. Section 7 made 
it unlawful to allow women and children to clean machinery while it was 
in motion and children and young girls were prohibited from working in cer-
tain positions around powered machinery in motion. 
The second set of provisions provided protection for all workers in fac-
tories. Section 14 imposed a general duty on employers not to "keep a fac-
tory so that the safety of any person employed therein is endangered, or so 
that the health of any person employed therein is likely to be permanently 
injured."14 Violators were subject to a fine of up to $500.00 or imprison-
ment for up to one year. The Act deemed a number of conditions to be vio-
lations of section 14. For example, section 11 created minimum standards 
regarding cleanliness, overcrowding, ventilation and closet accommodation, 
including a requirement for separate closet facilities for men and women. 
Section 12 required employers to comply with orders made by the inspec-
torate in relation to the above matters within a reasonable time. As well, 
the section specifically gave the inspector the authority to order that mechan-
ical means, approved by regulation, be installed in order to eliminate injuri-
ous levels of dust. Section 15 required fencing of machinery "as far as 
practicable;" guarding openings of hoistways etc.; and safety devices for ele-
vators. Section 16 created standards with respect to fire safety including: the 
provision of fire extinguishers "as the Inspector, acting under the regula-
tions made in that behalf, directs in writing;" outwardly opening exit doors; 
"Section 8. The circumsiances in which overtime was permitted included machinery breakdown 
and "the customs and exigencies of certain trades." 
l4The original Bill did not include a general duty to protect the health of the worker. 
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and fire escapes of certain specifications, "Provided, always, that any of 
the requirements of this sub-section may be dispensed with in any factory 
if the inspector so directs."" 
The last set of provisions related to administration and enforcement. The 
Act provided for the appointment of one inspector by the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council (s. 2(2)). The inspector was empowered to enter and 
inspect factories at all reasonable times without a warrant, unless the premises 
were also used as a dwelling (s. 25(1), 26). For the purposes of ascertaining 
whether factories complied with health requirements of section 12, the in-
spector was authorized to call upon the assistance of a physician or local 
health officer (s. 13). In any case where there was fear of obstruction, the 
inspector could call upon a constable for assistance (s. 25(3)). As well, the 
inspector was empowered to require the production of registers or other docu-
ments required to be kept by the Act, and to examine any person found in 
a factory with respect to the requirements of the Act (s. 25(2), 25(4)-(6)). 
Finally, the inspector was given general authority to "exercise such other 
powers as may be necessary for carrying this Act into effect" (s. 25(7)). Any 
person who obstructed an inspector in the execution of his or her duty was 
liable to a fine (s.25). 
In order to assist the inspector, employers were required, in some cir-
cumstances, to notify the inspector in writing within six days of deaths or 
serious injuries requiring employees to be off work for more than six days 
(s. 18, 19)," and to notify the inspector within one month after they began 
to occupy a factory (s.28(l)). The Act also required that certain notices be 
given to employees, including, notice of the provisions of the Act ("as the 
Inspector deems necessary"), and notice of the name and address of the in-
spector (s. 29). 
Prosecutions under the Act were to be brought before two justices of the 
peace in the county in which the offence was alleged to have been commit-
ted (s. 39). Informations had to be laid within two or three months after 
the commission of the offence (s. 38(1)), depending on the offence. Convic-
tions were not to be quashed for defects in form, and there was a preclusion 
of certiorari except for the purposes of hearing a special case (s. 38(6))) In 
addition to the power to fine or imprison, the court was given the authority 
to order that certain means be adopted in order to bring the factory into 
conformity with the Act (s. 32). 
The discretion to dispense with the fire safety requirements was not in the original Bill. 
T"he original Bill required that notice be given whenever the injury required the worker to be 
off work for forty-eight hours. 
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I 
The Implementation of the Act, 1886-1900 
ALTHOUGH THE ACT CAME INTO FORCE on 1 December 1886, no arrangements 
for its enforcement were made until the spring of 1887. Clearly, these ar-
rangements were critically important if the Act was to protect workers. The 
Act vested inspectors with broad discretionary powers to determine its oper-
ative meaning, and the government determined the resources committed to 
factory act enforcement. The most important question was not whether the 
state and its agents had then sufficiently empowered, but rather whether, 
and to what extent those powers would be exercised for the benefit of workers. 
A. Setting Up the Administration of Enforcement 
Manufacturers and workers realized this and actively lobbied the govern-
ment to insure that arrangements satisfactory to their interests were made. 
In response to earlier Dominion bills, manufacturers had expressed their con-
cerns regarding implementation, and in particular, the powers given to the 
inspectorate." Thus, it was not surprising that when a special meeting of 
the CMA was held on 30 November 1886 to discuss the Ontario Act, most 
of its provisions were found to be unobjectionable, "if properly applied, but 
there was also considerable anxiety displayed at the unlimited powers vested 
in the factory inspectors.'"" A committee of leading industrialists, includ-
ing H. A. Massey, J. Inglis, and Frederic Nicholls, was appointed to meet 
with Mowat to discuss the appointment of inspectors. At that meeting, the 
committee expressed its concern over the inspector's powers and its fear that 
a pro-labour inspector, whose decisions would be virtually unappealable, 
could put manufacturers to immeasurable expense. The delegation proposed 
that the government should appoint competent and impartial men drawn from 
the ranks of labour and capital so that, in the event of a dispute, consulta-
tion would be facilitated.1'' 
The Toronto Trades and Labor Council (TTLC) was equally active in 
lobbying the government. Even before the Act was declared in force, efforts 
were made to have local inspectors appointed.x Subsequent to its proclama-
'For example, at a meeting of the Ontario Manufacturers' Association called to discuss the 
Dominion Bill of 1883, it was agreed that too much power was given to the inspectors and that 
there were insufficient safeguards for manufacturers "who might become their victims." The 
Globe, 28 April, 1883. 
'"Public Archives of Canada, Canadian Manufacturers Association Papers, MG 28, 1230, 
Minutes, Special Meeting, 30 Nov. 1886; Globe, 1 Dec. 1886. 
'^Canadian Manufacturer, 6 May 1187. .hereinnfter CM) 
!0See The Globe, 3 Sept. 1884 for an account of a discussion in the Fire and Gas Committee 
of Toronto City Council about appointing a local factory inspector or petitioning the provin-
cial government to do so. 
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tion, meetings were held in November 1886 at which resolutions were passed 
calling on the government to appoint inspectors who possessed the confi-
dence of wage earners at large, and who were either nominated, or at least 
approved by labour organizations. Potential nominees were discussed, but 
it was not deemed expedient to forward specific candidates for considera-
tion by the government.21 The Toronto Evening News published an editorial 
supporting labour's concerns over the appointment process. 
A good deal of wire pulling is going on with regard to the appointment of Inspectors of 
factories Some persons are mentioned who have no qualifications whatever ... other than 
that always essential one in the eyes of a party government, activity as political heelers. We 
do not, of course, expect anything so Utopian as the appointment of any official on the sole 
ground of fitness But the labour organizations do expect that the inspectors ... shall, in ad-
dition, be competent men, and in synpathy with the cause of Labour Reform. If mere timeserv-
ers and political heelers are chosen, the Act will be a failure.22 
As a result of these lobbying efforts, and others, two amendments to the 
Act were introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 7 April 1887 by the 
government. The first created a special exemption from the prohibition on 
child labour, while the second provided for the appointment of regional in-
spectors instead of the single inspector that was provided for in the original 
Act. Although both labour and capital supported the appointment of more 
than a single inspector, their reasons for doing so were quite different. The 
CMA feared that if only one was appointed, he would likely be a labour 
supporter. Therefore, they favoured the appointment of at least two inspec-
tors, but probably not many more, in the hope that the second would have 
the confidence of the manufacturers. Labour, on the other hand, wanted 
local inspectors to be appointed in order to ensure that sufficient resources 
would be devoted to enforcement. William Meredith, leader of the Tory op-
position, sought to enhance his party's standing amongst workers by propos-
ing that there should be an inspector for each county appointed by the country 
council. C. F. Fraser, Commissioner of the Department of Public Works, 
replied that this would be impossible and that the government did not in-
tend to appoint more than two inspectors.'1 This position was in line with 
the views of the CMA.24 The amendments were passed and received Royal 
Assent on 23 April 1887." 
This cleared the way for the appointment of inspectors, but still did not 
resolve the question of how many would be appointed, from what back-
grounds they would come and how the province would be divided between 
them. The government ultimately decided to appoint three inspectors instead 
" Toronto Trades and Labour Council, Minutes, 5, 19 Nov. 1886. 
"Toronto Evening News, 22 April 1887. 
"Ontario. Legislative Debates, Globe, 20 April 1887. 
~
ACW, 6 May 1887. 
" S.O. 1887 c.35 (Ont.). 
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of two as Fraser had earlier declared. Although the reasons for this are un-
clear, if may have been done to counter Meredith's attempt to outflank the 
government by supporting labour's preference for the appointment of numer-
ous local inspectors.26 
Whether the CMA or labour organizations were consulted with respect 
to particular individuals is unknown,27 but the strategy followed by the 
government seems fairly apparent upon examination of the appointments 
made by Order in Council on 25 June 1887, effective 1 July.28 The province 
was divided into three districts with an inspector for each one. Robert Barb-
er, a manufacturer from Toronto was appointed inspector of the western 
district, including Toronto west of Yonge Street. James R. Brown, a mechanic 
from Oshawa was appointed inspector of the central district, including the 
eastern half of Toronto, and O. A. Rocque, an ex-alderman from Ottawa, 
was appointed inspector for the eastern district. Thus, we can see that the 
politically sensitive, and heavily industrialized south central area was divid-
ed between two inspectors, one drawn from the ranks of labour, and the 
other from the ranks of the manufacturers. Meanwhile, the less industrial-
ized eastern and northern areas of the province were assigned to Rocque, 
who, as far as can be determined, was a patronage appointment, pure and 
simple. Further, as between Barber and Brown, Barber was given the more 
heavily industrialized western sector.29 The pro-government Globe greeted 
the announcement of the appointments predictably. They congratulated the 
government "on having secured the services of men so competent and at the 
same time so acceptable to all whose interests are concerned in the just and 
fair administration of the factory laws.'"0 
" See Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.15, Series S-2, No. 1014, Letter from Edwards, Secre-
tary, Public Works Department, Ontario, to William Mack, MPP, Cornwall in response to 
a petition he presented signed by citizens of Cornwall in May-June, 1888, calling for the ap-
pointment of a local inspector. The pattern of party competition for labour support during 
this period has been noted by numerous commentators including Kealey, Toronto Workers. 
In a debate over factory inspection that took place at the Seventh Annual Conference of the 
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLCC) held in 1891, A. W. Wright, a labour "lead-
er" with a rather checkered career (see, Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 177-87) asserted that 
labour organizations were not consulted in the appointment of inspectors. See, The Labour 
Advocate, 11 Sept. 1891. With regard to the CMA, a circular letter dated 29 April, 1887 called 
for a general meeting to discuss, amongst other issues, recommendations for the appointment 
of a factory inspector. However, the Minutes of the meeting that took place on 4 May do not 
indicate whether the question was discussed. 
"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.3, O.C. 21/288. 
' See Ontario, Department of Public Works, Report of the Inspectors of Factories, 1888 
(Toronto 1889). (Note: The Report was published annually in the Sessional Papers of the Province. 
After 1888, the Inspectors reported to the Department of Agriculture. These reports are here-
inafter cited Inspectors of Factories, Year.) 
"Globe, 23 June 1887. 
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Little is known about the backgrounds of Barber and Rocque beyond 
the brief descriptions given above." James Brown's career prior to his ap-
pointment is better documented. His roots as a labour activist reach back 
to the nine hour movement of 1872 during which he emerged as a labour 
spokesman in Oshawa. He helped establish a branch of the Knights of Labour 
in Oshawa in 1882 and served as secretary of the Oshawa Trades and Labour 
Council, as well as chairman of its Legislative Committee." However, he 
also had a connection with the Liberal Party through D.J. O'Donoghue, and 
acted as the Oshawa correspondent for the Ontario Bureau of Industries af-
ter it began collecting labour statistics." 
Neither the CMA nor the TTLC commented on the appointments. 
However, it is quite likely that Brown's appointment disturbed the CMA. 
Not only was he an active and militant trade unionist, he had seriously an-
tagonized employers in Oshawa earlier in the 1880s by arguing that labour 
should be made the measure of all value in order to prepare the way "for 
industrial co-operation on an equitable basis." Such a step would, in Brown's 
view, "revolutionize the world."54 He, along with numerous other labour 
activists of the time, was influenced by the ideas of Henry George, and had 
urged the delegates to the Labour Congress convention of 1883 to study 
Poverty and Progress." -hortly bbfore his sppointment was snnounced, ,h 
became embroiled in a nasty exchange with the CMA over resolutions he 
had introduced as a delegate to the TLCC convention in September 1886. 
Petitions to the government based on these resolutions were attacked by the 
CMA, and Brown defended them vigorously in a letter to the CMA dated 
16 May 1887. 
It is a sad commentary on the boasted civilization and Christianity of the age that the self-
ishness and greed of one class of the community has enabled that class to successfully manipu-
late the representatives of the people, and to obtain the power which enables that class to set 
at defiance the petitions of labour for justice. 
The over-bearing arrogance of employers towards employees is too often the cause of strikes, 
and the indifference of employers to the welfare of workers has been the cause of untold suffering. 
The CMA was alarmed by Brown's letter and on 23 May, they reproduced 
it in a circular calling for an emergency meeting to discuss it." The outcome 
"in R. L. Polk and Co. 's Toronto City Directory (1884-5), a firm by tht name of Robert Barb-
er Jr. & Co. is listed as a manufacturer of woollen goods. O. A. Rocque served as an alderman 
in Ottawa from 1872-76. See, Historical Sketch oofhe County of Carlton (Tororto 1879) 9)6-76 
"Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 342--3 
"The Bureau began collecting labour statistics in 1883 at the request of the Labour Congress 
which met in Toronto in December, 1883. For Brown's report on Oshawa see Ontario, Bureau 
of Industries, Annual Report, 1884 (Toronto 1188), Ixxiii 
"Quoted in Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 3433 
"Cited in Ramsay Cook, The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Cana-
da (Toronto 1985), 114. 
"*See CMA, Circular Letters, 23 May 1887. 
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of the meeting is unknown, but the antagonism between Brown and the CMA 
intensified when Brown spoke out against legislation introduced into the 
Dominion Parliament on 10 June 1886 designed to break the control of Que-
bec dock workers who were able to make membership in their association 
a condition of employment." On 1 July, ,he day Brown's appointment be-
came effective, CM ran an editorial rebuking him for supporting trade un-
ion interference with individual rights of contract. In the same issue of CM, 
the appointment of the factory inspectors was noted without comment.'8 
The inspectors were initially placed under the supervision of the Com-
missioner of Public Works, C. F. Fraser. They received an annual salary 
of $1,000 dollars and ample provision was made for their expenses.w Upon 
assuming their duties on 1 July 1887, the inspectors were instructed to use 
the remainder of the year to make informal visits to the larger factories un-
der their jurisdictions for the purpose of introducing themselves, distribut-
ing copies of the Act and ascertaining the degree of compliance with the 
Act.4" These instructions were reflected in the descriptions of the inspectors' 
visits provided by witnesses appearing before the Royal Commission on Re-
lations of Labour and Capital in the fall of 1887." Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the Second Report of the Royal Commission found that existing 
factory legislation was largely inoperative." 
While the inspectors were out in the field introducing themselves, the 
government made additional arrangements for the enforcement of the Act. 
A regulation was prepared which prescribed various forms to be used for 
' For an explanation of the bill see Canada, House of Commons, Debates ((887), 862. 
"CM, 1 July 11887 Subsequent to his appointmentt CM crittcized Brown for some comments 
he made on the dock workers' legislation and for advocating the nationalization of the rail-
ways. CM never criticized the government for appointing Brown, and they never criticized him 
for his activities as a factory inspector. 
"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 21/288, Order-in-Council, 25 June 1887 contains 
the terms of their appointment. The annual travel expenses incurred by inspectors Brown and 
Barber averaged between $500.00-600.00 each. Inspector Rocque's were considerably less. The 
expenses incurred in enforcing the Act were reported annually in Public Accounts, published 
in the province's Sessional Papers. 
"'See, Inspectors of Factories, ,888, 8 (per Barberbe ana Brown's testimono before ret Royal 
Commission on Relations Between Labour and Capital (RCRLC) given in fall 1887. See RCRLC, 
Evidence-Ontario (Ottawa 1189), 311520. 
"For example, Thewilis Day, superintendent of the Cornwall Manufacturing Co., Cornwall, 
described how Inspector Rocque went through the factory's twelve rooms in 25-30 minutes, 
without consulting any of the operatives, and declared himself satisfied. RCRLC, Evidence, 
1071-2. Also see the testimony of Samuel Peddle, cabinetmaker, London, 633. The only manufac-
turer who reported receiving directions from an inspector was Joseph Firstbrooke, a Toronto 
box manufacturer, who was instructed by Inspector Brown to place a trap door over a hatch-
way, 312. 
4
"RCRLC, Second Reportt 79. The first report did not comment on the implementation of the 
Act. but did make recommendations for its enforcement. RCRLC. First Report, 11. 
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giving notices and for keeping registries required by the Act. It gave the in-
spectors authority to grant overtime permits pursuant to section 8, subject 
to prior approval by the Commissioner of Public Works. Finally, section 
7 of the regulations instructed the inspectors to take into account "any spe-
cial circumstances" which in their opinion "should be considered on behalf 
of the employers" when issuing remedial orders for violations of the health 
requirements of section 11.4] Arrangements were elso made with labour rn-
ions to have their members' complaints funnelled through the union to the 
inspectors and the inspectors were instructed to receive complaints in this 
manner.44 There is no record of other instructions from the government to 
the inspectors.4' 
B. The Inspectors Take to the Field 
In evaluating the implementation of factory legislation, it is necessary 
to face the challenge posed by some recent writers who dispute the 'stan-
dard' account of the ineffectiveness of factory regulation. The 'standard' 
account notes the inspectors' failure to vigorously exercise their prosecutorial 
powers and concludes that the Act was largely unenforced. The failure to 
prosecute employers is linked to a broader analysis of the limited ability of 
the state to regulate against the interests of capital because of the significance 
of class power. The 'conventionalization' of factory crime was a means of 
blunting the impetus towards regulation in order to avoid the untenable spec-
tacle of the state criminalizing the behaviour of the most powerful social 
class.46 
The essence of the revisionist critique is that the standard account incor-
rectly assumes that compliance could only be achieved by means of prosecu-
tion. It is their thesis that the inspectors chose persuasion and bargaining 
as an alternative enforcement strategy, and that this choice was justified be-
cause it made more efficient use of the limited enforcement resources avail-
Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 21/530 The Ontario Faclories' Regulations (first 
series), 1887, issued 29 November 1887. 
See, Report upon the Sweating System in Canada, Supplementary Report (House of Com-
mons, Session Paper 61a, 1896), 32, where Inspector Brown reported that, at the time of his 
appointment, he was informed by C. F. Fraser, then Commissioner of Public Works, that a 
reporting arrangement had been worked out with the unions. Brown also referred to Fraser's 
original directive in his last report as an inspector. See Inspectors of Factories, 1902, 18. 
Inspector Brown was asked in his appearance before the RCRl.C, "Have you been instruct-
ed to use persuasion rather than to prosecute?" Before Brown answered the Chairman inter-
rupted to suggest that the question was improper, and no answer was given. See RCRLC, 
Evidence, 320. 
^"he most sophisticated presentation of this thesis is that of W. G. Carson, "The Conven-
tionalization of Early Factory Crime," International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 7 (1979), 
175. 
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able. Not only does this analysis serve to vindicate the inspectors by depicting 
them as ingenious and spirited individuals, battling against stiff odds in an 
attempt to implement the legislation. It also serves to vindicate a positive 
perception of the liberal, pluralist democratic state by denying the significance 
of class power in determining the behaviour of the state and its agents. In-
stead, it portrays the state as an effective instrument for articulating and 
achieving outcomes that reflect community consensus.47 
This critique forces us to confront the fact that there are a range of en-
forcement strategies, and that the mere fact that a prosecutorial strategy was 
not chosen is not, in itself, sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that 
legislation was not enforced. In examining the enforcement process in On-
tario we will first identify the strategy selected by the inspectors, and then 
assess the reasons for its selection and its impact on the way compliance came 
to be defined by the inspectors. 
C. Enforcement Strategy: Prosecution or Persuasion 
In a prosecution model of enforcement, heavy reliance is placed on the 
detection, prosecution and punishment of violators. In a persuasion model, 
the emphasis is on bargaining in order to secure "voluntary" compliance. 
These models can be seen to mark the end points of a continuum. In prac-
tice, most enforcement agencies use some mixture of prosecutorial and per-
suasion strategies. Our first task is to identify and locate the strategy adopted 
by the Ontario's factory inspectors on this punishment-persuasion continuum. 
The model of enforcement that was adopted form the time formal en-
forcement of the Act commenced on 1 January 1888 to the end of fhe centu-
ry was that of persuasion, practically to the exclusion of any coercive element 
whatsoever. This is clearly indicated by Table 1 below. 
The table shows that in the first 12 years of the Act's operation a total of 
35 charges were prosecuted. Four charges were laid against parents for al-
lowing their under-age children to work. In a number of instances, several 
charges were laid against a single employer, and so the total number of em-
4,See, Bartrip & Fenn, "The Conventionalization of Factory Crime - A Re-assessment, Inter-
national Journal of the Sociology of Law, 8 (1980), 175 and "The Evolution of Regulatory 
Style in the Nineteenth Century British Factory Inspectorate," Journal of Law & Society, ,0 
(1983), 201. Also see Harry Arthurs, 'Without the Law'' Administrative Justice ana Legal Plural-
ism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto o985), 103-111 who is more sensisive to class fac-
tors, but who, nevertheless, sees factory inspectors as a proto-type of the model professional 
administrator who vindicates his faith in public administration and legal pluralism. 
There is a burgeoning literature that explains current enforcement practices on a similar basis. 
For example, see Hawkins, "Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the 
Enforcement of Regulation, Lawi. Politics Quarterly, 5 (1983), 33 and deljanovskik ""egula-
tory Enforcement: An Economic Study of the British Factory Inspectorate," Law & Politics 
Quarterly, 5 (1983), 75. 
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TABLE 1 
Prosecutions 1888-1900 
No. of Charges Prosecuted 
Year Barber Brown Rocque Total 
1888 1 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 1 
1897 
1898 
1899 !• 
1900 
Totals 3 
•Not mentioned in inspector's reports, but reported in R.V. Weir (1899) 20 CL. T. .32. 
Source: Report of the Inspectors of Factories, 1888-1900. 
ployers prosecuted is less than 31. On average, less than three charges were 
prosecuted per year. Of these, all but two were for violations of the provi­
sions regarding the employment of women and children and hours of work 
in bake shops. In the two cases involving violations of health and safety pro­
visions of general application, one related to ventilation," while the other 
involved a breach of the general duties clause." During this same period, 
there were 207 reported fatal accidents and 2,632 reported accidents causing 
serious injury. In none of these cases was the employer prosecuted for violat­
ing the Act.» 
One further point must be noted. Thirty-one out of the 35 charges 
48In 1898 Thomas Carroll was fined $2.00 for failing to provide adequate ventilation of dust 
for emery wheels. Inspectors of Factories, ,89898,. 
nR. ν. Weir (1899)) 20 C.L.T. .32. Thh eefendant was sconicted aa tirst instance, ,bu tth eco­
viction was quashed on the ground that three out of the seven persons present in the factory 
were employers. This reduced the number of employees to four, below the treshold for the ap­
plication of the Ac. 
"The inspectors annually reported on the accidents in their districts. In two cases in which boys 
between 12 and 14 were seriously injured or killed, the employer was prosecuted for failing 
to obtain a certificate of age. Inspectors of Factories, ,891, 1,1 
10 
5 
5 
1 
5 
5 
31 
1 
10 
5 
5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
5 
1 
5 
35 
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prosecuted were initiated by Inspector Brown. This suggests that he was far 
more willing than his colleagues to resort to prosecution as an element of 
the enforcement process. The reasons for this difference, and its significance 
for our understanding the choice of enforcement strategy generally, will be 
explored in the following sections of the paper. 
Did the inspectors choose persuasion because it was more efficient as the 
revisionists suggest, or did they do so because of the pervasive influence of 
class power? It will be argued here that the efficiency explanation does not 
escape the reality of class power, but merely masks it. This occurs because 
that approach treats the material and ideological constraints under which 
the inspectors operated as natural facts, unrelated to class and politics. This 
will be shown to be an untenable assumption. 
The resources devoted to enforcement of the Act were inadequate from 
the outset, and the situation deteriorated during the 1890's. In 1888, Barber 
found 375 factories in his district which spread out over 18 counties and the 
western half of the City of Toronto. Brown found 224 factories spread out 
over 16 countries and the eastern half of the City of Toronto. Rocque did 
not report the number of factories in his jurisdiction but, we can safely as-
sume that there were fewer than in Brown's, and that they were even more 
widely dispersed over nine counties and six districts. Barber reported that 
on his first formal inspection tour he was able to visit all the factories in 
his district by October, and then was able to conduct repeat visits of facto-
ries employing women and children. One can imagine the cursory nature of 
the inspections that were conducted in order to cover so much ground so 
quickly. As well, the inspectors claimed that they managed to visit factories 
within their districts that were not covered by the Act/1 
The workload of the inspectors increased substantially in 1889 as a result 
of an amendment to the Act which made factories employing more than five 
persons subject to its provisions/2 Inspector Barber reported that the alter-
ation in the definition of a factory more than trebled the number of estab-
lishments requiring inspection." Despite this enormous increase in 
workload, there was no increase in the complement of inspectors until 1895 
when Margaret Carlyle was appointed as female inspector of factories with 
a jurisdiction limited to issues affecting child and female labour.54 By 1901 
there were 6,543 manufacturing establishments in Ontario employing more 
Inspectors of Factories, ,888. 
The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 18899,.O. .188 9.43, s. .(2). 
"inspectors of Factories 1189, 6. 
4In her first years on the job she claimed to cover so much ground that, by comparison, her 
male colleagues' looked like slackers. In her first half year she made 611 inspections in 43 cities 
and in her first full year, she inspected 986 establishments, many of them several times. Inspec-
tors of Factories, 1895, 22 3nd Inspectors of Factories, 1896, 20. 
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than five persons, and still only four inspectors." As well, the factory in-
spectors were given responsibilities under legislation regulating bake shops 
in 1896 and commercial shops in 1897.5* 
Although the resources of the inspectors were not as thinly spread in 1888 
as they were in 1901, the problem of limited resources always constrained 
their selection of enforcement strategies. A strategy that heavily depended 
on frequent and thorough inspections to detect and remedy violations of the 
Act was simply not feasible under the circumstances. A negotiation strategy 
may have been more efficient. But, even if it was, it is important to remem-
ber that negotiating compliance is not a costless strategy. The ability of in-
spectors to effectively pursue this strategy would also be constrained by 
resource scarcity. Indeed, it is likely that inadequate enforcement resources 
were a more direct and significant determinant of the limited impact of fac-
tory legislation than was the choice of enforcement strategy. 
Moreover, the scarcity of resources was not a natural condition, but a 
politically created fact. While it is clear that the state would not, indeed, 
could not, provide unlimited resources for the enforcement of the Act, and 
in that sense scarcity was inevitable, the important issue was the degree of 
scarcity. The question of the initial commitment of resources to enforcement 
was, as noted, the subject of dispute between labour, which sought the ap-
pointment of numerous local inspectors, and the government, which thought 
the proposal "impossible."" The decision to appoint three inspectors did 
not end the matter. Labour continually complained about inadequate en-
forcement and lobbied the government to appoint additional inspectors and 
to provide permanent ones for manufacturing centres.58 The decision to 
limit the resources available for enforcement was clearly a political one, taken 
in the context of the class politics of the period, and not simply an expres-
"Census of Canada, ,901. Prior lo 1901, census dada was collected with respect to all manufac-
turers regardless of their size. It is therefore impossible to use that data as a basis for calculat-
ing the inspectors' workload. From 1901 onwards, data was only collected for manufacturers 
employing five or more persons. 
*The Bake Shops' Act, 1896, ,.O. .896, c. 64, ss .9 An Act respecting Shops ana Places other 
than Factories, S.O. 11897 ,c 511 ,ss 2(b), ,8(2). The later Acc gave the Lieutenant Goveenor 
in Council power to appoint inspectors, but did not stipulate that they were to be the factory 
inspectors. Nevertheless, the factory inspectors were made inspectors under this Act. See Pub-
lic Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 34/426, Order-in-Council dated 8 May 1897. 
'See above. 
For example, in the spring of 1888 the government received a petition signed by 470 citizens 
of Cornwall requesting the appointment of a local inspector. Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 
15, Series S-2, No. 1014. Later that year the TLCC passed a resolution calling on the govern-
ment to appoint local inspectors. Resolutions to the same effect were also passed in 1891 and 
1897. See TLCC, Proceedings sor rhe above years and Thh Labour Advocate, ,1 Sept. .1911 
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sion of some undifferentiated community consensus." 
The lack of resources was not the only constraint on the inspectors when 
selecting an enforcement strategy. The inspectors also had to consider polit-
ical controls on their behaviour and to cope with the administrative arrange-
ments made for the prosecution of cases. In Ontario neither the decision to 
prosecute, nor the conduct of the prosecution were entirely in the hands of 
the inspector. Although practices may have varied, there is evidence to sug-
gest that the inspectors were required to consult with the Deputy Attorney-
General before laying charges and that the actual prosecution was left to the 
local Crown Attorney.** However, it is not clear whether this aspect of the 
arrangements constrained the inspectors' freedom to prosecute. There is at 
least one case in which an inspector was advised not to prosecute6' but, in 
another, Inspector Brown was criticized by the Attorney-General's depart-
ment for only prosecuting three out of a possible eighteen charges against 
an employer who had worked female employees in excess of the hours per-
mitted under the Act.62 Indeed, in that same report Inspector Brown indi-
cated that the Deputy Attorney-General had expressed the view that sufficient 
time had elapsed for employers to become acquainted with the provisions 
of the Act and that ignorance was no longer an excuse for its contraven-
tion.6' This suggests that it was not resistance from the Attorney-General's 
office that was constraining the inspectorate. Rather, the evidence suggests 
that permission to prosecute was rarely sought by the inspectors in the first 
place.64 
This may have been due to the government's reputed attitude toward 
prosecution rather than to any direct interference by the Attorney-General's 
office. There is some evidence suggesting that the inspectors were given gener-
al instructions to be "reasonable" and to avoid confrontations with employ-
ers. For example, in 1895 Inspector Barber noted that the inspectors 
"understand it to be the wish of the Government that the Factories' Act shall 
be enforced in an efficient manner, with as little friction and annoyance as 
possible."65 A further indication of the government's negative attitude 
"See Bartrip & Fenn, "A Re-assessment," 182 for the assertion that the level of resources 
devoted to enforcement was a decision of an undifferentiated community. See Carson, "Early 
Factory Inspectors and the Viable Class Society - A Rejoinder," International Journal for the 
Sociology of Law, 8 (1980) 187, 190 for a critique of Bartrip & Fenn's usage of the notion of 
community in the context of nineteenth century Great Britain. 
"'inspectors of Factories, 1890, 22 1nd d896, 6,. 
61
 Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 9. 
"inspectors of Factories, 1890, 21. 1nspector Broww acknowledged dih error and dromised to 
prosecute every case in the future. 
"Ibid. 
Mln the inspectors' correspondence from 1898-1900, I found only one letter in which permis-
sion to proscecute was sought. James R. Brown to John Dryden, Minister of Agriculture, 27 
Sept. 1898. 
"inspectors of Factories, 189S, 1. 
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toward prosecuting employers arose from a meeting in 1897 between the Ex-
ecutive Committee for Ontario of the TLCC and the Minister of Agricul-
ture to discuss the enforcement of the Factory laws.66 The Committee 
brought to the Minister's attention complaints being made by the Hamilton 
TLC, amongst others, that "the Government will not allow the inspectors 
to enforce the Act" and urged him to be more energetic. The Minister is 
reported to have replied that "he was heartily in sympathy with the cause 
of labour, and that it was not the Government's object to secure convictions 
and fines as it was to cause a due observance of the laws by quiet means."67 
In sum, it is difficult to state conclusively the extent of direct Govern-
ment control over the decision-making of the inspectorate. To the extent that 
the inspectors faced political or administrative obstacles to prosecution, it 
was rational for them to resort to an alternate strategy. However, to simply 
explain the choice of enforcement strategy on the grounds of efficiency or 
rationality obscures the central importance of class politics in shaping the 
formation of implementation policy. 
Another reason given for the decision not to pursue a more prosecutori-
al strategy was that the inspectors met with judicial hostility when they at-
tempted to do so. Although frequent complaints of this nature were made 
by inspectors in other jurisdictions, no such allegations were made by the 
Ontario inspectors during this period. As well, although the labour move-
ment consistently complained about many aspects of the implementation of 
the Act, I have only discovered a single instance in which the judiciary was 
criticised for being "exacting" and "almost always against the interests of 
the working people immediately concerned" in their application of both the 
Factories Act and the Workmen's Compensatton For Injuries Act.** *he 
lack of judicial hostility to the inspectors can also be inferred from the results 
of the cases they brought. Convictions were obtained in 20 out of the 35 
charges laid. In nine cases the court gave the defendants time to comply with 
the inspectors orders, and in one of those, a conviction was later obtained 
when the defendant failed to do so. There were only three outright acquit-
tals. Although the fines were generally quite low, they were usually in line 
T"he factory inspectors were placed under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture in 1889. 
TLCC, Proceedings (1897), II. 
This was contained in a report of the Legislative Committee of the TTLC. See Labour Ad-
vocate, 10 July 1891. 
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with the amounts suggested by the inspectors, and certainly did not arouse 
their ire.69 
Another external factor offered as an explanation of why it was rational 
for inspectors not to prosecute is that the legislation itself created procedural 
or substantive hurdles which made prosecutions difficult to conduct success-
fully. One such difficulty was the requirement in section 38 of the Act that 
an information had to be laid within two or three months of the occurrence 
of the violation, depending on the penalty. The non-reporting of serious ac-
cidents frequently resulted in the inspectors discovering the accident only after 
the period had elapsed, and was offered as a reason for not prosecuting.70 
This explanation is not convincing because, even after section 38 was amended 
in 1895 to eliminate the possibility that immunity could be acquired by non-
reporting,7' there was no increase in prosecutions. 
A second possible difficulty with the Act was that the standards that em-
ployers had to satisfy were prescribed in open-ended language. For exam-
ple, there was no definition of overcrowding (s. 11(2)). Factories had to be 
ventilated "so far as is reasonably practicable" (s. 11(3)), and moving parts 
of machinery had to be "as far as practicable, securely guarded" (s. 15(1)). 
Initially it was contemplated that regulations defining these requirements 
would be promulgated, but by 1889 it was recognized that enforcement would 
have to proceed in their absence, and the Act was amended accordingly.72 
The absence of objective standards could have made it more difficult to es-
tablish that the Act had been breached. It is by no means clear, however, 
that this proved to be a problem in the few charges laid pursuant to sections 
worded in these ways that were brought under section 14. For example, in 
the one case brought under the general duty requirement, a conviction was 
obtained at first instance, although it was subsequently quashed on unrelat-
ed grounds.7' As well, in another case, a conviction was obtained for inade-
For discussions of difficulties inspectors experienced with the courts in other jurisdictions see, 
C. Walker, A History of Factory Legislation ana Inspector in New York State, 1886-1911 (Ph.1( 
thesis, Columbia University, 1969), 221-8; Bartrip and Fenn, "The Administration of Safety: 
The Enforcement Policy of the Early Inspectorate, 1844-1864," Public Administration, 58 
(1980),87. In two cases the result could not be ascertained. With respect to the question of fines, 
the highest fine recorded was $25.00 for employing a boy under the age of 12 who lost two 
fingers in machine gearing. (Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 32). This was excextional. Most fines 
were less than $5.00. 
Indeed, in one case a prosecution was dismissed because the information was out of time. 
This led the inspector to call for an amendment to the Act. Inspector of Factories, ,891, 1,-5. 
1,The Ontario Factories Amendment Actt 1895, S.O. .895 5. 50, s.lll 
7:For example, in the original Act, section 12 gave the inspectors the authority to issue remedial 
orders for violations of the provisions regarding sanitation, ventilation and overcrowding, pur-
suant to regulations made in relation to those subjects. The Ontario Factories' Amendment 
Act, 1889, s.7, amended that sectton by adding the words "if any" thereby empowering the 
inspectors to act in the absence of regulations. 
"/?. v. Weir, (1899), 20 C.L.T. 232. 
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quate ventilation notwithstanding that section 11(3) only required factories 
to be ventilated "so far as is reasonably practicable." 
A third possible weakness of the Act was that it failed to deal with some 
of the more significant hazards in the workplace. For example, the Act did 
not contain specific requirements for the operation of boilers and, although 
legislation to remedy this defect was regularly introduced, it was vigorously 
and successfully opposed by employers. However, it is not clear how great 
an obstacle this posed to the inspectors. They were specifically authorized 
by the Attorney-General to rely on the general duties section when dealing 
with matters not falling under more specific clauses, and were successful in 
the one case they prosecuted under this section." As well, the Act was 
reasonably comprehensive and, with the exception of boiler regulation, when 
problems in the Act were identified, the legislature frequently remedied them. 
In sum, inasmuch as some prosecutions were not undertaken because of 
the external constraints on the inspectors, this does not explain why prose-
cution was resorted to so infrequently. The explanation is more complex and 
is hinted at by the following incident. In Hamilton v. Groesbeck, an em-
ployers' liability case, the court was called upon to interpret section 15 of 
Ontario's Factories' Act which imposed an obligation on employers to guard 
the moving parts of a machine." The court construed the section narrow-
ly. It its view, it only applied to transitive parts of a machine, not its work-
ing parts. In effect, this meant that saw blades did not need to be guarded, 
only the parts that supplied power to them. On its face, the case suggested 
that poor legislative drafting combined with judicial hostility would have de-
terred the inspectors from attempting prosecutions. However a closer exami-
nation of the surrounding circumstances undermines that conclusion. First, 
section 15(1) was subsequently amended by the legislature to overcome this 
restrictive interpretation.76 Second, this case was exceptional. There was no 
pattern of restrictive judicial interpretations of factory or employer liability 
legislation." Finally, Inspector Barber favourably commented on the low-
er court's ruling in his annual report. He treated the decision as a vindica-
tion of his own views on the scope of the section, although he claimed that 
he had advised employers to guard these parts in the past even though they 
were not legally obliged to do so.78 The fact that he publicly expressed his 
agreement with the court's interpretation is surprising, because the Govern-
ment had joined the plaintiff's appeal in support of a broader interpretation 
74See, Inspectors o/Factories, 18900,2. 
"Hamilton v. Groesbeck ((891), 18 O.A.R. 437 aff'g. 19 O.R. 76. For a discussion of the 
relevance of the Factory Act to an employer liability action see, Tucker, "Employers' Liabili-
ty," 245-6. 
16The Factories smendment Act, ,895, S.S.O.95 c. 505 ss. 3.6. 
"Tucker, "Employers' Liability," 241-44. 
78Inspectors so Factories, 1890, 11-2. 
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of the Act. More importantly, Barber's comments suggest that his narrow 
interpretation of the legislation was at least as significant in explaining his 
behaviour as any constraint externally imposed by the courts, by unfortunate 
legislative drafting or even by government policy. Certainly this was the 
TTLC's interpretation of this incident at the time. They referred to Barber's 
comments on the case in his Report as evidence of his lack of sympathy with 
the objectives of the law, and emphasized that his views were inconsistent 
with those of the Government.™ 
In sum, scarce resources were the most substantial external constraint 
on the inspectors' choice of enforcement strategy. Successful prosecutions 
require the commitment of resources. Violations had to be detected, evidence 
collected and given, and counsel instructed. In the face of limited resources, 
a strategy of enforcement that relied primarily on prosecutions would not 
have been feasible. Nevertheless, efficiency considerations did not dictate 
a strategy which virtually abandoned prosectution as a tool of enforcement. 
Inspectors might have responded differently to the problem of scarce 
resources in order to maintain a more vigourous prosecutorial component 
to the enforcement program. 
First of all, the Act contained numerous provisions that would have facili-
tated prosecutions if the inspectors had chosen to initiate them. The inspec-
tors were given substantial powers of investigation and examination by section 
25 of the Act. Section 3 provided that a person found on factory premises 
was deemed to be an employee until the contrary was proved. Further, in 
1889, the Act was amended to make a person charged under it a competent 
and compellable witness.80 
One way of reducing the costs of detection would have been to develop 
a network of informers. This was only attempted on a limited scale. Arrange-
ments were made for trade unions to funnel the complaints of their mem-
bers to the inspectors and, in fact, complaints were received by the inspectors 
in this manner.81 As well, the inspectors received complaints directly from 
See, The Labour Advocate, 12 June loy1. 
The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, S.O. 1889, c. 42, s.12. 
For example, as a result of complaints by the Hamilton Trades and Labour Council that Barb-
er was not enforcing the Act, a meeting between Barber, accompanied by Brown, and represen-
tatives of the Hamilton TLC was held at which arrangements were made for the Hamilton TLC 
to act as the medium of communication between workers and the inspector. See, The Labour 
Advocate, 20ct . 1891. Reference to similar arrangements are to be found in the evidence taken 
by the Commission on the Sweating System in Canada, 30. As well, the inspectors' correspon-
dence for the years 1898-1900 contains letters from trade unions and councils referring the in-
spectors to specific matters that had been brought to their attention. Correspondence from these 
years was fortuitously saved by virtue of the act that in 1901 the Legislative Assembly ordered 
a return of all correspondence and papers having refrence to the enforcement of the Act. See 
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Session Paper 79, (unpublished, 1901), on file at the Public Ar-
chives of Ontario, R.G.49, Series I-7-B-2. (Hereinafter referred to as Inspectors' Correspondence). 
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employees and other interested persons.12 There were, however, significant 
limitations on this source of information. Although these communications 
were received in confidence by the inspectors, employees remained fearful 
of employer retaliation.*1 Thus, it was not surprising that when inspectors 
received direct complaints, they were sent anonymously under names such 
as "One Who Knows," "A.Victim," "A Sufferer," or "An Upholder of 
Decency."*4 It does not seem, however, that the inspectors actively cultivat-
ed a network of informants." Further, although they frequently claimed to 
speak with employees during their inspections, the fact that they were com-
monly accompanied by the owner or a superintendent made communication 
of complaints a risky undertaking for the employee.*6 Perhaps, it can be ar-
gued that because intimidation made it difficult to rely on informers, it was 
rational not to adopt a strategy that depended on them. However, such a 
characterization obscures the class basis of the constraints on the rational. 
The inequality of power between capital and labour manifested itself in rela-
tionships of domination that were enforced by intimidation and exclusion. 
As Inspector Brown noted in commenting on employer threats: "[P]ity it 
is that one human being should have the power to determine as to whether 
another should be permitted to obtain a living or not."87 
Section 29(2) of the Act provided for the posting of the name and address of the inspector 
at the entrance to the factory, or at such other locations as the inspector directed. However, 
section 21 exempted factories not employing women and children, as well as some private dwell-
ings, from this requirement. At the behest of the inspectors this exemption was eliminated in 
1889. See, The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, S.O. 1889, c. 43, s. 8 and Report 
of Inspectors, 1889, 6. The names of factory inspectors were also published in Labour Day 
Souvenirs published by local Trades and Labour Councils. For example see Allied Trades and 
Labour Association, Labour Day Souvenir, 1898, (Ottawa). 
For example, Brown noted that he had encountered employers, "who when they hear of com-
plaints being made, do not scruple to express the threat that if they only knew the parties who 
complained they would be discharged at once." He then commented, "It is not to be wondered 
at, therefore, that parties having complaints to make should seek to do so through other par-
ties, rather than run the risk of losing their employment." See, Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 
21. Similar fears were articulated in the evidence before the Commission on the Sweating Sys-
tem in Canada, 30-3. 
The policy of maintaining confidentiality was referred to by Inspector Rocque in Inspectors 
of Factories, 1888, 28. Rocque also reported that he received no complaints in his first year. 
Rather than attributing this to fear, he saw it as a sign "that good feeling seemed to exist be-
tween the employers and employees." 
Inspectors Correspondence. 
The only reference to the use of such a strategy comes from Inspector Rocque who, feeling 
frustrated by the difficulty of securing evidence regarding child labour, noted that he had se-
cured the assistance of people in various localities in collecting such information. See, Inspec-
tors of Factories 1899, 17. 
See for example, Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 5-6. The practice of inspectors being accom-
panied by foremen or proprietors was one of the matters raised by the Hamilton TLC in their 
meetings with Barber in 1891. See The Labour Advocate, 2 Oct. 1891. 
Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 21. 
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The Act also contained provisions which aimed to reduce the cost of en-
forcement. Employers were required to maintain various registers, and to 
give the inspectors notice that they had occupied a factory and that a serious 
injury had occurred on the premises.88 The maintenance of registers of child 
and female employees and of hours of overtime presumably were intended 
to make it easier for the inspectors to monitor compliance. Notice of occu-
pation of factories was designed to assist the inspectors in keeping up with 
changes within their districts, as well as alerting them as to the degree of 
mechanization in new factories. However, the effectiveness of these devices 
in reducing the amount of time an inspector would have to spend either to 
monitor compliance or to locate new factories largely depended on the will-
ingness of employers to comply voluntarily. The fact that failure to comply 
could result in a prosecution under the Act did not, in itself, pose a serious 
incentive to comply, since the enforcement of these obligations required the 
expenditure of the same scarce resources that the provision was designed to 
conserve. Not surprisingly, inspectors experienced some difficulty with the 
implementation of these recordirtg and notice provisions." 
Accident reporting caused inspectors the most problems. Accident report-
ing can serve a variety of functions in factory regulation. On the one hand, 
it can provide a data base which can be used to identify widespread hazards, 
evaluate their seriousness and educate employers about preventative meas-
ures they can take. If used in this way, accident reporting is non-threatening. 
The information obtained is not used as the basis for taking some action 
aimed directly and exclusively at the reporting employer. On the other hand, 
accident reporting can be used as a means of detecting violations that result-
ed in death or serious injury. These violations might be considered particu-
larly suitable for prosecution, or for a remedial order. If used in such a 
manner, employers would obviously be less inclined to comply voluntarily 
with the accident reporting requirements. 
There can be no doubt that employers initially resisted the accident report-
ing requirements. For example, in the first year of inspection, only five of 
the 50 accidents Barber discovered were reported.90 This could be partly ex-
plained by the novelty of the requirement and its limited scope." However, 
it could also be explained by the fact that employers initially feared that ad-
ditional inspections, possible prosecution and an increase in the likelihood 
"'The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884, ss. 9, 18, 19, 28 and 29. 
"For example, Barber reported in 1900 that since 1887 he received only 12 notices of occupan-
cy. He discovered new factories by consulting business directories and newspapers. See Inspec-
tors of Factories, 1900, II. 
'"inspectors of Factories, ,888, 1. 
'Sections 18 and 19 only required the employer to report terrous accidents requiring the wor-
ker to be off work for six days which were caused by fire or other specifically mentioned causes. 
As well, s. 21 created exemptions from the reporting requirement. 
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of successful employer liability actions by their employees would result from 
reporting.92 
The inspectorate tried to achieve better compliance with the reporting 
requirements in a variety of ways. First, they sought to have the legislation 
amended to rationalize the requirement and eliminate any confusion that 
might have existed. Thus in 1889 the Act was amended to limit the scope 
of the section 21 exemption with respect to factories not employing women 
and children," and in 1895 the Act was further amended to require that all 
serious accidents, however caused, be reported.** Inspectors also assured 
employers that adverse consequences would not follow from reporting. The 
preventative purpose of reporting was emphasized by the inspectors, as was 
the separation between factory regulation and employers' liability litiga-
tion." While these measures seem to have improved the regularity of report-
ing, " inspectors continued to discover unreported accidents through other 
sources. This led to the adoption of a third strategy, the threat of prosecu-
tion for non-reporting.97 This was a weak threat. If the inspector was late 
in discovering the non-reporting, prosecution would be precluded because 
of the expiry of the period for laying informations.9* Moreover, in the one 
instance in which a prosecution for non-reporting was commenced, it failed 
With regard to the avoidance of prosecutions, non-reporting might result in the accident never 
coming to the attention of the inspector, or if it did, it might only come after the two or three 
month limitation period for laying informations had expired. ( s. 38(1)). In employer liability 
suits, a finding that the injury had been caused by a violation of the Factory Act usually result-
ed in strict liability. See Tucker, "Employers' Liability," 245-6. Inspectors could be called as 
witnesses in such actions until 1905 when they were given immunity. See The Statute Law Amend-
ment Act, 1905, S.O. 1905, c. 13, s. 30. 
nThe Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, s. 8. 
""The Faccories' Amendment Act 18955,s 7. 
As noted earlier, there were practically no prosecutions arising out of occupationally related 
deaths or serious injuries. Thus, when Barber explained that the purpose of reporting was to 
lessen the incidence of accidents (Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 7) employers understood that 
this did not entail the imposition of sanctions. With respect to employers' liability, Barber reported 
that he frequently told employers that reporting of accidents had nothing to do with the institu-
tion of legal action for damages by employees. (Inspectors of Factories, 1892, 6.) Further reas-
surance that this separation would be maintained was provided in 1905 when the Act was amended 
to allow inspectors to refuse to testify with respect to matters arising out of their inspections. 
"indeed, the inspectors frequently attributed increases in the number of reported accidents in 
their districts to better reporting. For example, see Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 7. 
''Failure to report was punishable by a fine of up to $30.00. Ontario Factories' Act, ss. 18,19. 
For instances in which prosecutions were threatened see Inspection of Factories, 1892, 26 and 
Inspection of Factories 1898 6 18. 
Inspection of Factories, 1893, 13. 
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because the injured employee and attending physician testified that she could 
have returned to work within six days." 
In sum, the inspectors could have invested more effort in pursuing strate-
gies designed to maintain a stronger prosecution component to their enforce-
ment program. They chose not to do so. In part, this may be explained as 
a rational choice made in the face of external constraints, some of which 
directly reflected the reality of unequal class power. As well, the decision 
reflected a set of beliefs and assumptions about the causes of unsafe and 
unhealthy work conditions and the way these could be reduced or eliminat-
ed. On the whole, the inspectors believed that education was the best way 
to achieve compliance. The elements of this worldview need to be reconstruct-
ed in order to appreciate their impact on the choice of enforcement strategy. 
The inspectors' worldviews included assumptions about the causes of ac-
cidents, the social responsibility of employers, the compatibility of labour 
and capital's interests in occupational health and safety and the special vul-
nerability of women and children. These assumptions were a critical deter-
minant of the behaviour of the inspectors. Indeed, even if we accepted that 
the inspectors were motivated solely by their desire to use their scarce resources 
efficiently, their efficiency calculus was significantly influenced by their out-
looks. The salience of ideology in explaining the choice of enforcement strate-
gy is manifested most clearly in the differences that emerged between 
inspectors Brown and Barber.100 
The first component of the inspectors' worldviews was their assumptions 
about accident causation. Barber did not believe that most accidents and in-
juries were caused by violations of the Act, or by unsafe conditions. In Barb-
er's view, accidents were primarily caused by worker carelessness. For 
example, in his first report, Inspector Barber cited Mr. Whymper, Superin-
tending Inspector for the Southern Counties of England. 
Factory Acts and Inspectors may, should, and, as I now contend, do help to save life and 
limbs by their efforts to call attention to, and protect dangerous gearing; but they cannot, although 
indeed they are often credited with the power to do all sorts of things, eradicate people's love 
for amusement, their inattention, their recklessness. 
Barber then noted, "Most accidents are traceable to one or the other of these 
causes."102 In a similar vein, Inspector Rocque stated, "I have found belt-
Employer intimidation seems likely. The employee had part of two fingers cut off and a third 
injured. The inspector visited her eight days after the accident and was told that she was still 
in pain and unable to work. Inspectors of Factories, 1893, 20. 
inspector Rocque seems to have shared Barber's worldview, but because he was assigned the 
less industrialized eastern district his activities did not attract as much attention as Barber's. 
Cited in Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 7. 
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ing, shafting, gearing and moving machinery in all factories in my district, 
fairly well fenced in and guarded; and I consider that very few accidents would 
occur, if workmen would exercise more prudence while using or working 
around machinery in motion."103 To the extent that Barber recognized a 
connection between the labour process and the accident rate, he still tended 
to blame the worker, or consider the accident unpreventable, presumably 
on the basis that monotonous or intense work were conditions that workers 
had to adapt to and not conditions that inspectors should be condemning.'04 
Inspector Brown differed from his colleagues in this regard. He attribut-
ed accidents to non-compliance with the Act, and recognized that the em-
ployment of young and untrained people, lengthy hours of work on dangerous 
machinery, piece-rate payment schemes and speeding-up production were fre-
quently the underlying causes of what appeared to others as worker care-
lessness.105 As well, he recognized that accident reports from employers 
which routinely blamed worker carelessness or disobedience were untrust-
worthy.I06 Although Brown may have felt he could not change these con-
ditions, he was prepared to condemn them as the "butcher bill" of increased 
productive power.107 
Barber's belief that violations of the Act were not a major cause of oc-
cupational deaths and injuries contributed to, and strengthened a second be-
lief: that the overwhelming majority of employers were willing to cooperate 
with the inspector in eliminating violations or hazards that were pointed out 
to them. He and Rocque continuously repeated the observation that they 
were cordially received by employers who expressed a desire to conform to 
the Act and who took a real interest in the welfare of their employees.108 
Regret was expressed when employers resisted recommendations that involved 
substantial expense, but this did not detract from the overall positive per-
ception of employer cooperation.00* Employers who exhibited this positive 
attitude merited understanding from the inspectors. They were not to be treat-
ed as potential offenders who had to be carefully monitored in order to de-
tect deviant behaviour, but rather were to be educated and assisted in their 
w,Ibid., 29. 
""inspectors so Factories, 1897, 8-98 
""inspectors of Factories, ,890, 08 (young geople); Inspectors of Factories, 18918 14 (non-
compliance); Inspectors of Factories, 1892, 14 1long hours); Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 28 
(piece-work) and Inspectors of Factories, ,899, 15 (speed-ups). 
""'Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 15. 
'"'Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 161 
l08For example, see, Inspectors of Factories, ,889, 8. 
""For example, Inspector Barber notes in his report for 1891 that "I have been in all cases cor-
dially received by employers, who, with very rare exceptions, show every disposition to con-
form to the requirements of the Factories' Act, so long as no great outtay of money is involved 
in making the changes necessary to accomplish that object." Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5. 
This observation does not detract from the positive tone of the report. 
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efforts to conform to the law."0 Given this view of the social responsibili-
ty of employers,'" it made perfect sense to regard one of the primary func-
tions of the inspector as an educator who provided information to employers 
on safety technology and plant design."2 Increasingly, the inspectors' 
reports came to be filled with information and advice of this nature. 
Of course, not all employers fell into the category of the socially respon-
sible. The inspectors also reported the existence of a small minority of em-
ployers who regarded the Act and the inspectors as an unwarranted intrusion 
into their private affairs. Fortunately, this minority was seen to be decreas-
ing in size as the inspectors succeeded in educating them and gaining their 
confidence by demonstrating their reasonableness. Inspector Rocque 
described this approach aptly: 
When the Act came in operation the employers mistrusted the Inspectors, and were so 
prejudiced against them and the Act that they considered it as an interference with their busi-
ness and liberty as citizens; but by using much discretion and enforcing the provisions of the 
Act gradually and in such cases only which seemed, at the time, reasonable to the employer 
the Inspectors have succeeded in divesting him of all prejudices; and in my district I must say 
thai I have now reached a point where I can secure the co-operation of mostly all employers 
and many overseers, not only in the carrying out of all suggestions made in accordance with 
the Act, but also any propositions to better the conditions of the employees.1" 
In a world in which employers are cooperative, or can be easily won over, 
a persuasive strategy of enforcement is eminently reasonable. Prosecutorial 
activity would only serve to destroy the trust upon which the cooperative 
relationship is built. It was on the basis of these perceptions that the inspec-
tors came to see prosecution as an option to be resorted to only in excep-
tional cases. This approach to prosecution was most clearly articulated by 
Inspector Barber: 
Though I have during the year met with many cases where some slight violations of the 
Act have occurred, through not attending to some of its provisions, still I have not met with 
See, Inspectors of Factories, 1889, 7, where Inspector Barber recites the following speech 
of Mr. Whymper, H. M. Superintending Inspector of Factories and Workshops, with approval. 
[BJy some to carry out the Factory Act is thought to mean that every place should be 
visited at short regular intervals, without reference to the expediency of the visit, and 
that every district should be, as it were, patrolled by Inspectors; that, in a word, no sin-
gle irregularity, however rare or isolated, should take place without approximate cer-
tainty of detection and punishment. In the eyes of others, to carry out the Act means 
to prevent these rare irregularities being multiplied to an extent which would involve hard-
ship or injury to the protected persons, and it is this meaning which I, for one, accept. 
"'Hawkins' found that pollution enforcement officers in modern England also made the as-
sumption that most dischargers were socially responsible. See Hawkins, Environment and En-
forcement (Oxford 1984) 110. 
For a similar view of how factory inspectors defined their role see Jones, "An Inspector 
Calls: Health and Safety at Work in Inter-War Britain," in Weindling, éd.. The Social History 
of Occupational Health (London, 1985), 223. 
Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 23. 
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any such that I considered as intentional, but rather an oversight. I might more particularly 
refer to the non-reporting of accidents, and occasionally employing a child without first procuring 
a certificate of age. I have not thought it necessary to lay these matters before you and recom-
mend prosecutions, believing that in time as employers become more familiar with all the pro-
visions of the Act, the inspector will have very little to complain of. Prosecutions, I consider, 
should be resorted to only when violations seem wilful, or through indifference, and where other 
means fail to have the law observed."4 
The belief that most accidents were either unavoidable or the result of 
worker carelessness, and that most employers were good citizens who were 
prepared to cooperate with the inspectors meshed with, and reinforced a third 
component of the inspectors' worldview: that health and safety in the work-
place was not an issue on which there was, or ought to be, conflict between 
employers and workers. Factory regulation was seen to be mutually benefi-
cial to employers and employees alike. Of course, the inspectors realized that 
this view was not self-evidently true, particularly to employers, and that one 
of their tasks was to convert the non-believers. We have already seen that 
the inspectors undertook to demonstrate to employers that they would be 
reasonable in exercising their discretionary powers under the Act. One aspect 
of that reasonableness was the willingness of the inspectors to be sensitive 
to the general economic climate. For example, during the recession/depres-
sion of the early 1890s Inspector Barber noted, "In making my inspections 
I do not overlook the unsatisfactory state of trade in many industries, and 
in some cases have passed by some alterations required that I would not have 
done had trade been more prosperous, as regards these factories.""5 In-
deed, even in good times, the cost of remedial action, such as the introduc-
tion of fans, was taken into account by the inspectors in exercising their 
discretion as to what constituted compliance with the Act."6 
Of course, the inspectors were not always willing to defer to employer 
arguments about costs. Indeed, inspectors frequently argued that compli-
ance was in the economic self-interest of employers because the long term 
economic benefits flowing from compliance outweighed its immediate costs. 
For example, in his report for 1890, Inspector Barber provided a general 
defence of factory legislation which concluded with a quote from the En-
glish Royal Commission of 1875 on the impact of regulation. 
We have no reason to believe that the legislation which has been productive of such marked 
Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 9-10. 
Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5. A similar sensitivity to the economic conditions was ex-
pressed by Margaret Carlyle in 1897. "Though actuated with a desire to enforce all laws by 
which we are governed for the benefit and protection of the labouring classes, yet, in view of 
the depressed condition of business of all kinds in the first part of the year, it was necessary 
to be very careful not to make demands that were not absolutely necessary." Inspectors of Fac-
tories, 1897, 18. 
"''Inspectors of Factories, 1894, 9. 
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benefit to the operatives employed, has caused any serious loss to the industries to which it 
has been applied. On the contrary, the progress of manufacture has apparently been entirely 
unimpeded by the Factory Acts; and there are but few, even among employers, who would now 
wish to repeal the main provisions of the Acts, or would deny the benefit which has resulted 
from them."7 
The gospel that "safety pays" was preached by the inspectors. Improved 
conditions and a working day that did not exceed the legal limits would in-
crease worker productivity and firm profitability. As well, employers were 
told of the general benefit of having a satisfied workforce, and that the Act 
would relieve competitive pressure generated by employers who "are not 
abreast of the times.."" 
The inspectors also believed that there was no fundamental conflict of 
interest between workers and their employers over health and safety. Indeed, 
they believed that the industrial system operated to the mutual benefit of 
employers and employees in all areas. As such, it was expected that in nor-
mal times employees would be as willing to be reasonable in their demands 
as were the inspectors, since their interests were not fundamentally different 
from those of their employers. Therefore, when employees complained about 
violations of the Act or the failure of the inspector to intervene on their be-
half, the difficulty was frequently attributed to labour unrest having noth-
ing to do with health and safety. 
The best example of this attitude arose out of a controversy in Brantford 
over a demand for ventilation fans. On 13 June, 1898, Mr. F. Mather, Secre-
tary of the Brantford Trades and Labour Council, wrote to the Attorney-
General complaining that, despite several complaints to the inspector, no 
action had been taken to require the installation of fans in a number of fac-
tories in the town. The matter was referred to the Minister of Agriculture 
who forwarded the complaint to Inspector Barber. On 16 June 1898 Barber 
wrote to the Minister explaining the problem as one in which "there is an 
animus against the Company because they do not recognize the Union and 
the Union wants to cause them annoyance and to get my help." No action 
was taken. A further complaint was sent to the Minister on 19 October, 1899. 
After further investigation the Minister responded on 10 November, stating 
that, "I do not think it advisable to unduly press the matter at the present 
time, as I have no doubt the firm will duly comply with the requirements 
of the Act as soon as they can do so without serious injury to business." 
'"Inspectors of Factories, ,890, 0,1 
"^Inspectors of Factories, ,892, 5. 
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Upon further complaint, the Minister finally ordered Inspector Barber to 
take action on 9 March 1900.'" 
Just as Inspector Brown disagreed with his colleagues over the cause of 
accidents, so too he disagreed with them over the other components of their 
world view. Although he advised employers in his first report that, "I have 
endeavoured, in enforcing the Act, to put a liberal construction upon its re-
quirements, not asking to take undue advantage of any non-conformity not 
in wilful violation of the Act," and noted the willingness of most employers 
to comply, he also recognized that employers and employees did not neces-
sarily share a common interest. This was not seen to be just a function of 
some ill informed employers who "appear to be indifferent to their 
[employees'] welfare," but rather the result of an industrial system in which 
"production and distribution are carried on primarily with a view to make 
money for individuals and firms of an employing class, and without regard 
to the interests of the workers engaged in production and distri-
bution...."120 
The fourth component of the inspectors' world views was their attitude 
toward women and children. In this regard, there were no significant differ-
ences between Barber and Brown, or for that matter, between Carlyle and 
her male colleagues. All were equally vociferous in their denunciations of 
the evils of child labour, although Brown was somewhat more sensitive to 
the harsh economic realities that sometimes led working class parents to send 
their children into the factory.121 They also all claimed that the laws in this 
regard were vigorously enforced.122 
With regard to female labour, the male inspectors generally reported on 
their enforcement of provisions designed to protect female labour with little 
bee, Inspectors Correspondence. In commenting on these events in his annual report Inspec-
tor Barber noted, "I wish to do justice to the workers and the employers, and sometimes I 
reach a deadlock When there is a good understanding between the polishers' union and the 
employer there are few complaints, but it is quite different when all is not harmonious. All 
complaints with respect to ventilation and dust have been investigated, and the cause of com-
plaint has been, or is being removed as far as possible in most cases." Inspectors of Factories, 
1899, 3-4. 
Inspectors of Factories, 1893, 15. 
Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 15. 
An equal number of parents and employers were prosecuted for violations of the child labour 
laws. The following comment of Inspector Carlyle is typical. 
The welfare of the child cannot be sacrificed to the short-sighted demands of parents, 
who, for their own apparent benefit, would doom their children to a life of toil and ig-
norance. My view of the duty, as it regards the enforcement of this, or any other law, 
is, that while good judgment and discretion ought always to be employed, the whole 
fabric of legal protection to child labour could be undermined if the enforcement of these 
laws were left to discretion of the Inspector. 
See Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 22. 
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or no commentary.123 There were some expressions of special concern aris-
ing from a perceived female disposition to panic in emergencies,124 but on 
the whole, the rhetoric of the male inspectors was milder than that of many 
of the reformers who had called for legislation in the first place. The entry 
of women in fields that had previously been exclusively male was noted with 
some mild reservation, but certainly no great alarm.125 
Of course, much of the male inspectors' responsibility for the enforce-
ment of provisions relating exclusively to women was alleviated by the ap-
pointment of Margaret Carlyle in 1895 as Female Inspector of Factories.126 
Pursuant to the Order-in-Council appointing her, except as regards to pro-
visions relating to machine fencing and fire safety, she was given complete 
jurisdiction over factories employing female labour only, and shared juris-
diction over matters relating to the employment of women and children in 
mixed settings.127 Not surprisingly, she was paid half as much as the male 
inspectors.128 The appointment of a female inspector was widely supported 
on the grounds that it would facilitate the enforcement of those provisions 
designed principally for the protection of female employees.I2' 
Inspector Rocque reflected the prevailing wisdom when he reported, The Act is also cal-
culated to protect society in providing such regulations as would guard the morals where so 
many persons of different sexes are employed in the same workrooms...." (.Inspectors of Fac-
tories, 1893, 17). 
l24See Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 8 (Barber). 
'"inspector Barber noted that he could not, in his own mind, accept all the justifications 
offered for having women perform work which ten or fifteen years ago had been considered 
proper for men only (Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 7). Inspector Brown, in tht course of con-
demning the sweating system in the clothing trades, noted that wives and daughters of work-
men who take out work from clothing houses "to eke out the wages of a husband, or father, 
or it may be to get a little 'pin money' " drive down the wages of those who depend on their 
jobs for a living, (Inspectors of Factories, ,893935)5 Broww nlso expressed discomfort tith 
having to deal with "female employers who are of a masculine turn." (Inspectors of Factories, 
1891, 15)) 
Carlyle had been employed in manufacturing establishments in Glasgow prior to emigrat-
ing to Canada. Prior to her appointment she was in business for herself in Toronto. As well, 
she was an active suffragist. See Bacchi, Liberation Deferred? (Toronto o983) )9, 44 1nd Mor-
gan, éd., The Canadian Men and Women of The Time, 2nd éd.. (Toronto 1912), 200. 
'"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.3, O.C. 32/360, Order-in-Council, 5 July, 1895. 
l28Even after nearly twenty years' service, Carlyle was paid less than the most junior male fac-
tory inspector. See Ontario. Public Accounts, Sessional Paper I, (Toronto 1913-14). Carlyle 
advocated equalizing the wages of men and women as a solution to the downward pressure 
on wages that resulted whenever women began to perform work previously done exclusively 
by men. See Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 31 Obviously, she die not achieve this goag for herself. 
l29As one commentator noted at the time "There must be women inspectors where there are 
women employees The greatest trials and hardships of a factory women's life can be told only 
to one of her own sex " Annie MacLean "Factory Legislation for Women in Canada " American 
Journal of Sociology 5(1899) 172 180 Both Barber and Brown commented on the fact that 
Carlvle had received complaints that otherwise would not have surfaced Inspectors of Facto-
ries 1895 9 13 
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Given her mandate it is not surprising that Carlyle focused on matters 
such as hours of work, ventilation and sanitation, including the provision 
of separate lavatories for men and women. However, her general world view 
was more consistent with Barber's than Brown's, including her view that 
workers were frequently responsible for their own misfortune.130 With 
respect to women, she vigorously defended the appropriateness of their en-
try into the public sphere of industrial production. She defended the honoura-
ble position of "factory girls'"" and promoted conditions conducive to its 
protection. For example, she recommended that young girls be supervised 
by women overseers,"2 and upbraided foremen for using abusive lan-
guage.'" In general, her worldview seems very much in line with the 
"maternal feminism" of other middle class reformers of the period.'54 
What impact, if any, did these values and assumptions have on the en-
forcement of the inspectors? The most striking pattern is that 29 of the 35 
charges prosecuted related to the protection of child and female labour. On 
its face this suggests that when it came to enforcing these provisions, the 
inspectors' belief in the special vulnerability of women and children, and the 
immorality of exploiting that vulnerability, significantly influenced their will-
"°For example, Carlyle claimed that poor sanitary conditions were mostly the fault of the oper-
atives themselves. 
Employees often mis-use the best provisions made for their comfort and welfare. They 
destroy ruthlessly the most expensive plumbing, and litter and soil rooms uselessly. On 
the other hand there are places where women of refined habits, and high sense of order, 
carry those qualities into their working surroundings. 
Inspectors of Factories, ,8989 282 
A very large percentage of our factory girls are beautiful types of Christian devotion 
and fine womanly feeling. I am sure you will find as large a number of generous self-
sacrificing sisters and daughters among mill help as among any other class in the world. 
There is honor in every right walk of industry, whether it is weaving fabrics or selling 
the product from the counter. 
Inspectors of Factories, ,896, 242 
"'Inspectors of Factories, ,899, 262 
'"inspectors of Factories, 1900, 212 ("I fail to understand dow anyone calling himself a man 
could be guilty of such conduct.") 
l34See Linda Kealey éd., A Not Unreasonable Claim (Toronto 1979), ,nd dspecially Waane 
Roberts, " 'Rocking the Cradle for the World': The New Woman and Maternal Feminism, 
Toronto, 1877-1914," Ibid., 15. A classic example of the rhetoric of maternal feminism can 
be found in the speech of Cora Stuchfield, a woman factory inspector from Pennsylvania, given 
before the tenth annual convention of International Association of Factory Inspectors held in 
Toronto in 1896, and attended by Carlyle. 
In every woman's soul is a desire to benefit her fellow-beings, and she does it whenever 
a chance is afforded her. This great quality of heart has been a mighty factor in our 
civilization, and where could woman find a more unlimited or better field to aid in up-
lifting and reducing the sufferings of toilers in the factories? 
A true woman carries with her an atmosphere which makes itself felt.... 
International Association of Factory Inspectors, Convention Proceedings ((196), 75-6. 
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ingness to stigmatize violators by prosecuting them. The time for negotiated 
compliance to take place was reduced. However, equally striking is the fact 
that 27 out of these 29 charges were initiated by Brown. This suggests that 
even though the inspectors agreed on the need for special protection, only 
Brown saw prosecution as an appropriate means of providing it, despite the 
fact that he faced the same external constraints as they did. This difference 
can perhaps best be explained on the basis of his understanding of the moti-
vation of employers and the limits of persuasion as an enforcement strate-
gy. Further, it suggests that instrumental rationality is not a sufficient 
explanation of enforcement behaviour. Rationality cannot be divorced from 
the assumptions and values brought to bear in evaluating the problem to be 
resolved. 
D. Constructing the Meaning of Compliance 
Beyond the question of the choice of enforcement strategy lies the ques-
tion of what significance, if any, did the differences between Brown and Barb-
er have on the levels of risk to which workers were exposed. Were the workers 
in Brown's district any better off than were the workers in Barber's district? 
The accidental injury and death data that we have for this period is proba-
bly too crude to allow meaningful comparisons to be made and I have not 
attempted to do so.'" 
Another way of trying to assess the impact of enforcement strategies is 
by comparing the way in which different inspectors constructed the mean-
ing of compliance with the Act. An understanding of this is critically impor-
tant for evaluating enforcement behaviour and strategies. For example, if 
compliance was constructed in such a way so that few, if any, serious haz-
ards were found to be unlawful, then it would make little difference whether 
we had a negotiated compliance model or a prosecution model. Both would 
be equally passive and ineffective in improving workplace health and safety. 
We must, therefore, look beyond the choice of enforcement strategy and also 
examine the standard of compliance that was selected by the inspectors. In 
particular, it will be useful to identify any differences in the way inspectors 
Barber and Brown constructed the meaning of compliance, and relate that 
to the differences we have already identified in their worldviews and their 
enforcement strategies. 
The meaning of compliance was, in many instances, far from clear on 
the face of the statute. We have already noted that the open-ended language 
used in many sections of the Act gave the inspectors a significant amount 
For a study that attempts to measure the impact of different enforcement strategies on ac-
cidental rates in nineteenth century England see Bartrip & Fenn, "The Administration of Safe-
ty: The Enforcement Policy of the Early Inspectorate, 1844-1864," Public Administration, 58 
(1980), 87. 
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of discretion in determining the meaning of compliance. Further, manufac-
turers expressed great fears that this discretion might be exercised to their 
detriment by inspectors sympathetic to the cause of labour. There is not much 
direct evidence on how Barber and Brown interpreted the Act and its require-
ments, and so any conclusions must remain qualified. Nevertheless, I think 
it is fair to surmise that, on the whole, the inspectors defined compliance 
in a way that did not require employers to incur substantial costs in order 
to alter their technology or work practices. Moreover, as between Brown and 
Barber, Brown was the more demanding. 
We have already seen that both the government and the inspectors were 
willing to consider profits as a relevant criteria in enforcing the Act. This 
was illustrated by Barber's comment on an amendment to the Act that en-
hanced the discretionary power of the inspectors. 
Of course this leaves a great deal to the judgment of the inspectors, and may in some appli-
cations of it be the means of a difference of opinion arising between them and employers; but 
I am sure that when such differences do arise, and the employers can give good reasons why 
such dangers should not be protected, the inspectors will be reasonable, for they understand 
it to be the wish of the Government that the Factories' Act shall be enforced in an efficient 
manner, with as little friction and annoyance as possible. 
To the extent that profitability was incorporated into the criteria of what 
was reasonably necessary for the safety of workers, it would lead to a con-
struction of the meaning of compliance which would not be terribly burden-
some to employers. 
Another reason for hypothesizing that compliance came to be construct-
ed in a way that was favourable to employers arises from a sociological per-
spective on the interaction between inspectors and regulatees. It has been 
noted that there is a tendency for inspectors to become more sympathetic 
towards employers and their compliance problems after they have spent time 
in the field.'" In part this may be explained by a desire to avoid the un-
pleasantness that is likely to occur in the face of a continuing adversarial 
relationship. The nineteenth century factory inspectors frequently expressed 
their relief that nothing of an unpleasant nature had occurred in the course 
of carrying out their duties. Another cause of this phenomenon relates to 
the symbolic dimensions of authority. Inspectors not only wanted to avoid 
unpleasantness; they wanted the authority conferred upon them to be respect-
ed. This would be particularly true in the context of a situation in which that 
authority was to be exercised with regard to persons who would otherwise 
be considered to have a higher socio-economic status. The effect of this dy-
namic suggests that in negotiating the meaning of compliance, an employer 
Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 7. 
For contemporary evidence see Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden (Cambridge 
1981), 184. 
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who recognized the inspector's authority by indicating a willingness to take 
some action in the future in response to the inspectors concerns would be 
found to be in compliance with the Act by the inspector.58 
The effect of these factors on the standard of compliance imposed by 
the inspectors is uncertain. The inspectors indicated that in negotiating com-
pliance with employers, they required improvements to be made. They also 
claimed that significant improvements were taking place as a result of their 
efforts. However, it is unclear how much weight we should give to the in-
spectors' self-evaluations, given the obvious incentives to promote a posi-
tive view of their work. For example, despite the continual assurance that 
progress was being made, the same kinds of problems re-appeared year af-
ter year. Frequently it is difficult to determine whether an inspector is telling 
us about actual changes, or is reporting on the extent to which the employer 
has indicated a willingness to change in the future. The following excerpt 
from a report by Barber typifies this ambiguity. 
[I] am pleased to be able to report that I have been in all cases cordially received by em-
ployers, who with very rare exceptions, show every disposition to conform to the requirements 
of the Factories' Act, so long as no great outlay of money is involved in making the changes 
necessary to accomplish that object. . . . 
The Inspector has at times to make suggestions that are not at all welcomed by the employ-
er, and it is gratifying to me to be able to say that in the pursuance of my duties this year, 
nothing of an unpleasant nature has occurred with any of the persons among whom my duties 
called me, and, further, 1 have every reason to belleve that most of my suggestions have been 
carried out, so far as time for doing so would permit, for some of them are of recent date.1" 
Further evidence that the operative meaning of compliance generally 
favoured employers comes from the fact that while the labour movement 
regularly complained about inadequate enforcement, there do not appear 
to be any complaints from business groups about excessively strict enforce-
ment. Indeed, business groups sometimes praised the inspectors' behaviour. 
At the annual convention of the CMA held in 1888 Secretary Nicholls reported 
that, "the inspectors under the Factory Act have so far acted impartially 
and that, whilst requiring that the provisions of the statute be respected, have 
not caused undue friction by arbitrary interpretations of such provi-
sions."140 Indeed, the following year Nicholls pointed to the Act's im-
plementation as a vindication of the Association's decision not to oppose 
the measure.141 The only other time CM discussed factory inspection was 
"
8This point is made by Hawkins in a contemporary study of pollution inspectors. "What the 
polluter actually does by way of compliance is probably no more important for the field officers 
than that some sign of compliance is made, a sign of respect for their ultimate authority sym-
bolizing a willingness to comply." Hawkins, "Bargain and Bluff," Law & Politics Quarterly, 
5 (1983), 35, 56. 
'^Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5-6. 
"°CM, 17 Feb. 1888. 
'"CM, 15 March 1889. 
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when they came to the defence of Inspector Barber who had incurred the 
displeasure of the TTLC for consenting to an alteration of the hours of work 
that was not permitted by the statute."2 
Notwithstanding that the above evidence suggests that, in general, the 
meaning of compliance was constructed in a way that did not threaten to 
disrupt the employers' business, there is evidence to suggest that Brown was 
somewhat more exacting in his demands on employers than were his col-
leagues. This difference is found most clearly in a controversy over ventila-
tion that erupted in the City of Toronto in 1899. On 24 October, 1899, the 
Minister received a letter from D. J. O'Donoghue, Secretary, Legislative Com-
mittee, Toronto Trades and Labour Council, complaining of conditions in 
a number of factories in Toronto. Some of those factories were in Brown's 
district, others were in Barber's. The complaints were forwarded to the ap-
propriate inspector. Barber reported on 3 November. 
In no shop is the air as good as that outside and I suppose men working in such places 
ten hours daily do feel a small proportion of dust—more than one making an occasional visit. 
But in no factory visited did I find such a condition existing that would cause me to take action 
without having a complaint first. Some of the employers I have spoken with expressed their 
readiness to provide blowers if ordered to, but denied the need of them, and blamed the Polish-
ers' Union for the present agitation. 
Brown reported on 21 November. 
Hitherto in the past, where only one machine has been in operation principally for buff-
ing, I have not insisted on a fan being installed for the removal of dust. 
Having had an interview with representatives of the Polishers and Buffers Union with regard 
to the installation of fans in places where only one machine is in operation, they represent that 
one man using a machine where dust is generated suffers in health from inhaling such dust and 
his health should be protected as well as that of the workers where more than one machine is in use. 
Brown recommended that fans should be installed, and sought a directive 
of general application from the Minister on this point so as to assure unifor-
mity in the enforcement of the Act. As well, he arranged to have Peter Bryce, 
Secretary, Provincial Board of Health, inspect the factories in question. Based 
on his inspection and a review of the medical literature, which even then recog-
nized occupational disease from metallic dust, Bryce supported Brown's 
recommendation. The Minister referred the matter back to the inspectors 
for a common recommendation. None was forthcoming. In separate letters 
both dated 8 January 1900, Brown recommended that a directive be issued 
to the inspectors requiring the installation of fans, while Barber recommended 
that the matter should be left to the discretion of each inspector. 
The paper trail runs cold at this point and it remains unclear how the 
controversy was resolved. However, the incident clearly illustrates how the 
T"he matter involved the lengthening of the weekday working day in exchange for a shorter 
workday on Saturdays. See CM, 2 Jan. 1891. For labour's views see Labour Advocate, 26 Dec. 
1890, and 23 Jan. and 13 Feb. 1891. 
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different assumptions and values of Barber and Brown influenced not just 
their choices of enforcement strategy, but their appreciation of the standards 
that employers were required to meet in order to bring themselves into com-
pliance with the Act. Although there is no inherent reason why a more 
prosecutorial strategy would be accompanied by more exacting standards, 
our analysis suggests that the same factors that lead to one, also lead to the 
other. This further points to the weakness of an analysis of enforcement that 
focuses too strongly on the efficient allocation of scarce resources in the face 
of external constraints. More prominence must be given to the ways in which 
the mission of the enforcement agency and its officials are constructed. 
II 
Conclusion 
THE ENACTMENT OF FACTORY legislation in the 1880s can be viewed as a 
concession to the demand of workers that the state be empowered to insure 
that minimally safe and healthy workplace conditions were provided by em-
ployers. The ability of workers to obtain concessions was not just a function 
of their level of organization and ideological orientation, but was also aided 
by presence of middle class reformers concerned about the impact of indus-
trial capitalism on women and children who were drawn into factory work, 
and by manufacturers who were resigned to having factory legislation as a 
cost of obtaining the political support they needed for economic policies 
designed to promote local industry. However, the goals that these groups 
sought to achieve through factory legislation were contradictory. In particu-
lar, employer concerns over their profitability and freedom to control and 
direct the labour process were, at least potentially, in conflict with worker 
demands for safer and healthier work environments. The legislation itself 
did not specify how these contradictory pressures were to be resolved, leav-
ing it instead to the implementation process. The critical importance of the 
implementation process was recognized by both workers and manufacturers 
from the time factory legislation was first proposed, and it was in this process 
that workers suffered their most serious defeats. 
There can be no doubt that, from the outset, the resources devoted to 
enforcement were woefully inadequate. This was an unavoidable reality for 
the inspectors and obviously limited their options in developing an enforce-
ment strategy. As well, they faced other constraints including government 
attitudes and the difficulties of detecting violations and gathering evidence 
that could be used to prosecute employers. However, these constraints were 
either a direct function of, or significantly exacerbated by, the structural in-
equality of class power which manifested itself in the political and economic 
spheres. Thus, even if it could be maintained that the decision to adopt a 
MAKING THE WORKPLACE'SAFE* 83 
negotiated compliance strategy was based entirely on the determination that 
it made the most efficient use of resources, the significance of class power 
on the ability of the state to regulate against the interests of capital would 
still not be negated. Furthermore, scarce resources and other external con­
straints limited the effectiveness of any strategy of enforcement, even if the 
most efficient one was selected. 
It is also not clear that, even in the face of the problem of scarce resources 
and other constraints, efficiency dictated the virtual abandonment of prose­
cution as a weapon in the inspectors' armory. A number of recent writers 
on enforcement have suggested that an efficient enforcement strategy requires 
a mix of tactics, including prosecution for firms that cheat or « n o n -
cooperative." On the assumption that not all Ontario employers were an­
gels the virtual absence of prosecutions raises a serious doubt that the in­
spectors chose the most efficient strategy. 
I have also argued that the selection of an enforcement strategy by the 
inspectors cannot fully be understood without recognizing the significance 
of their worldviews. The predominant view was that worker carelessness was 
the most important cause of accidents; that employers were socially respon­
sible; that there was no fundamental incompatibility between the interests 
of labour and capital over factory regulation; and that women, and particu­
larly children, required special protection. From this perspective, educating 
workers and employers on occupational health and safety appeared to be 
a reasonable approach. As well, with the exception of Brown, the inspectors 
accepted the intensification of the labour process and expected workers to 
adapt to it. They knew, however, that these changes did result in more work­
place injuries, but viewed these an unpreventable. Thus, it seems, they ac­
cepted the fundamental legitimacy of an industrial capitalist system, and saw 
the role of the state and its agents as one of reacting to, and limiting, the 
excesses of that system, not controlling its normal consequences. The excesses 
were seen to relate almost exclusively to its failure to provide special protec­
tion to women and children, and with respect to children, working class par­
ents were seen to be at least as guilty as the manufacturers. 
This worldview was not uniformly shared by the first factory inspectors 
in Ontario, but it is clear that Brown was the exception. He represented a 
continuing link between working class politics and ideology of the 1880's 
and the implementation of the factory legislation it promoted. The triumph 
of "Barbarism" can be understood in part as a consequence of the triumph 
of industrial capitalism over the alternatives espoused by groups such as the 
Knights of Labour. Although this triumph was never total, it left in its path 
a pattern of state interventions which succeeded in mediating and contain-
M3For example, see Scholz, "Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Law ά Po­
litics Quarterly 6 (1984) 385 and Braithewaite, To Punish or Persuade (Albany 1985), 119-148. 
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ing class conflict through relatively minor legislative concessions that were 
administered compatibly with the industrial capitalist order.1" 
The choice of a negotiated compliance model of enforcement, in con-
junction with the construction of the meaning of compliance which accept-
ed many risks commonly present in workplaces resulted in the resolution of 
the ambiguities present in the legislation in ways that were compatible with 
employers' interests in profitability and the maintenance of control over the 
labour process. This suggests that the compliance or persuasion model of 
enforcement adopted by the majority of inspectors did not, in practice, turn 
out to be much of an enforcement model at all. Rather, it closely resembled 
a capture model in which the agency and its officials stop trying to alter the 
behaviour of the regulated.'45 
The pattern of enforcement that was established in nineteenth-century 
Ontario was, by no means, unique to this Province or, indeed, to this peri-
od. It was literally the "conventional" wisdom of the time, and still prevails 
today."6 An understanding of the origins of these views may not explain 
their persistence, but it does suggest that they are deeply rooted in, and de-
termined by the structural inequality between labour and capital that is typi-
cal of industrial capitalist social formations.14' 
/ wish to thank my research assistant Nancc Kleee whose enthusiasm and 
resourcefulness greatly contributed to this paper. I would dlso like to thank 
Harry Glasbeek, Neii Gunningham, Craig Heron and Andrew RaRachanfor 
their comments on earlier drafts. 
l44For other instances of this pattern see, MacCallum, "Keeping Women in Their Place: The 
Minimum Wage in Canada, 1910-25," Labour/Le Travail, 17 (1986), 29, aan Craven, Impar-
tial Umpire. 
I45I am unsure what Hawkins had in mind when he wrote, "To regard a compliance strategy 
of enforcement at field level, or the formulation of prosecution policy at headquarters as sym-
ptomatic of the capture of the regulators misses the point. The practice of regulatory enforce-
ment expresses an identity of moral values which transcends the regulator-regulated relationship." 
Supra note 000, 207. If all he meant is that the regulators and the regulated share common 
values formed outside of the relationship, I find the statement unobjectionable, although in-
complete. Kelman's Regulating America suggests that values aller as a resull of the relation-
ship. However, in a context in which the applicable norms are a matter of dissensus, and in 
which the interests of labour and capital are in conflict, the existence of an identity of values 
between the inspectorate and employers does not transcend the notion of capture; rather, it 
becomes indicative of its establishment. 
l4
*The international dimensions of this dominant worldview can be seen in Barber's citation 
of English inspectors in support of his views. These views were routinely presented at the con-
ventions of the International Association of Factory Inspectors. For a particularly good exam-
ple see the speech of Rufus Wade, Chief Inspector of Massachusetts, in International Association 
of Factory Inspectors, Convention Proceedings (1896), 32. That convention was seld in noron-
to and attended by the Ontario inspectors. 
With respect to subsequent periods, preliminary research into the period between 1900 and 1914 
indicates that negotiated compliance became the exclusive model of enforcement, and that not-
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withstanding the inspectors' glowing self-evaluations, the accident and injury rate rose quite 
dramatically. For a critical analysis of the current state of occupational health and safety regu-
lation in Ontario see Tucker, "The Persistence of Market Regulation of Occupational Health 
and Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism," in England, éd., Essays in Labour Relations Law 
(Toronto 1985), 219. The most recent affirmation of this approach is to be found in McKenzie 
and Laskin, Report on the Administration of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Toron-
to 1987) where the authors dismiss the view that workers and employers have a conflict over 
health and safety, and that the imbalance of power between them must be redressed, with the 
assertion that, "In the view of this study, these assumptions are inaccurate." (Vol. I, C. 2, p. 9). 
l47For an interesting discussion of the impact of historical patterns on current practices see Car-
son, "Hostages of History: Some Aspects of the Occupational Health and Safety Debate in 
Historical Perspective," in Creighton & Gunningham, eds., The Industrial Relations of Oc-
cupational Heallh and Safety (Sydney 1985) 60. 
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